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and political thought. The doctrine’s apparent demise after the 1930s
facilitated the development of a methodological approach that embodied
what Lon Fuller once called “the spirit of the Federalist Papers”: an openended engagement with the problem of designing democracy and controlling
public power. At its best, this discourse was critical and propulsive, with
each purported solution generating more questions than it answered. The turn
against congressional delegations will likely bring to a close this period of
open and self-critical experimentation. In its place, we are likely to see the
emergence of warring visions of the administrative state, each claiming
legitimacy—neither credibly—according to its own comprehensive
normative doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the United States’ leading professor of jurisprudence issued a
provocative call to rethink administrative law.1 Legality, Lon Fuller
observed, depended on certain fundamental attributes—an “internal
morality”—that demanded a minimal degree of clarity, generality,
prospectivity, and consistency in application, and a system that wholly
lacked one of these attributes would not be a “legal system” in any
meaningful sense of the term.2 It was not lost on Fuller that law’s internal
morality presented a fundamental challenge for the administrative state,
which was then about to enter a period of remarkable growth. A legal system
of clear, stable, and generally applicable rules laid down in advance was
well-suited to facilitating free-market capitalism, but these same principles
stood in fundamental tension with alternative, more interventionist forms of
social and economic organization.3 To the extent that modern government
was called upon to intervene in markets, regulate industry, and set
contentious social policy, Fuller’s internal morality of law would seem an
obstacle rather than an ideal.4 It seemed, in other words, that we were faced
with a zero-sum choice: either uphold the rule of law or embrace the
administrative state.
This dilemma, Fuller insisted, required a careful and critical response.
The emerging institutions of the administrative state would entail tradeoffs
1
See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). This, of course, is not how
Lon Fuller’s 1963 Storrs Lectures, later published as the Morality of Law, are ordinarily remembered
today; lawyers and legal theorists are far more likely to have encountered Fuller in the context of the
ongoing debate between positivism and natural law. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Inner Morality
of Private Law, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 27, 27–31 (2013). Others have noted the potential incompatibility of
Fuller’s theory of law to the administrative state, though they understate the extent to which Fuller himself
grappled with these issues. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 397–408 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 444 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The
Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1927 (2018).
2
FULLER, supra note 1, at 33–94, 96.
3
See id. at 24–25 (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944)); E. B. Pashukanis,
The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111, 111-225 (Hugh W. Babb
trans., 1951). See generally Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of
Marxist Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949).
4
See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 1, at 170–81.
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between the internal morality of law and other pressing social values and
policies—tradeoffs that can have profound ramifications for individuals’
lives and for the use of public power.5 It would be a mistake to assume that
the new institutions of the administrative state must be governed according
to the same principles of legality that applied to the institutions of laissezfaire capitalism, just as it would be a mistake to indiscriminately deploy
governmental power for one’s chosen ends without any concern for
institutional checks.6 In other words, the growth of administrative power
demanded not a zero-sum choice, but subtle and ongoing attention to the
problems of institutional design: “Something like the spirit of the Federalist
Papers will become essential—a spirit at once inquiring and constructive.”7
This Essay reconstructs what Fuller meant by the “spirit of the
Federalist Papers” and argues that something like this spirit actually did
come to characterize the theory and practice of U.S. administrative law in
the ensuing decades. Fuller’s “spirit,” at least as this Essay reconstructs it,
denotes a continuing and open-ended engagement with the problems of
designing institutions to control and channel political power. It is concerned
with the values that are embedded and reflected in everyday institutional
arrangements, and it seeks to bring those values to light and subject them to
scrutiny.8 This spirit is “inquiring and constructive,”9 in the sense that its
practitioners are constantly seeking new ways to design regulatory policies,
programs, and bureaucracies. The process of investigation, critique, and
revision is ongoing as successive generations continually attempt to find “the
most apt institutional design for governmental control”10 over a changing
economy. The “spirit of the Federalist Papers,” then, is exemplary of what
Jeremy Waldron calls “political political theory—theory addressing itself to
politics and to the way our political institutions house and frame our
disagreements about social ideals and orchestrate what is done about
whatever aims we can settle on.”11
5
See id. at 179. Fuller’s argument thus presages the “institutional choice” approach outlined in NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1994).
6
FULLER, supra note 1, at 181.
7
Id.
8
For an approach that bears a family resemblance to Fuller’s spirit, but in a different substantive and
philosophical tradition, see Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087,
1151 (2013).
9
See FULLER, supra note 1, at 181.
10
Id. at 175. In a passage notable for its relevance to the present day, Fuller stresses that the
administrative apparatus has already struggled to grapple with transformations in the economy and warns
that it will in the future have to deal with “the as yet largely unfaced dislocations that will be brought by
increasing automation.” Id. at 176.
11
JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 6 (2016).
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In the U.S. administrative state, Fuller’s own call for a renewed spirit
of engagement may have been largely ignored,12 but his words nonetheless
proved prophetic. Over the next decade, a discourse emerged that
interrogated the normative foundations of the administrative state, asking
whether and on what terms it could be legitimated by reference to democratic
principles.13 At its best, this discourse was critical and propulsive, with each
purported solution generating more questions than it answered.14 The
administrative state became a distinctive and productive laboratory for
rethinking the role of democratic governance under conditions of extreme
complexity: “massive” and “wicked” problems,15 the demand for extensive
technical knowledge,16 and globalization.17 But this thinking took place—had
to take place—against a background assumption, with which Fuller
concurred, that the kind of administrative state we need will never be
effectively controlled and legitimated through general and prospective rules
laid down in advance by a watchful legislator.
This background assumption, of course, was never shared by a large
and influential proportion of U.S. politicians and legal professionals who
remained skeptical of the administrative state. On June 20, 2019, this
skeptical position secured a preliminary but significant victory in Gundy v.
United States, wherein four Justices signaled their desire to reconsider the
Court’s longstanding, hands-off approach to broad delegations by Congress
to administrative agencies.18 On this view, the proper guide for designing,
coordinating, and legitimating the administrative state is not the “spirit” of
the Federalist Papers, but the Federalist Papers themselves, along with other
indicia of the Constitution’s original meaning and purpose.19 And the
Constitution, on the skeptical view, forbids overly broad delegations from

12

I have found no other piece engaging specifically with this part of Fuller’s best-known work. In
preparing this piece, I was surprised to find I may be the only law review author to have expressly
referenced this “spirit of the Federalist Papers,” despite more than 1,800 citing references to Fuller’s book
in leading legal databases. See J. Benton Heath, Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 1, 47 (2016).
13
See infra Part I.
14
See, e.g., infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of a model of
“interest representation” in administrative law and the problems attending that model).
15
E.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72–79 (2010).
16
E.g., Martin Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will
the Globe Echo the E.U.?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 342–44 (2005).
17
See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing the
emergence of global regulatory networks).
18
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2118–20 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
19
See id. at 2133–35 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Congress to the Executive, and empowers the federal courts to police and
invalidate those delegations in the service of individual liberty and
deliberative democracy.20
The upshot of this approach is that the broad delegations on which much
of the administrative state is founded may now be “under siege,”21 awaiting
only a clever litigant and a fifth vote from Justice Kavanaugh, who took no
part in Gundy. Commentators have already observed that the resurrection of
the nondelegation doctrine would jeopardize large segments of the
administrative state and make future ambitious policymaking all the more
difficult by forcing Congress to reach far broader agreement before passing
legislation.22 Four Supreme Court Justices appear to agree, warning that if
the measure in Gundy is impermissible, as the dissent argues, then “most of
Government is unconstitutional.”23 In the wake of the Gundy dissent,
commentators have argued that the administrative state is too much a
practical necessity, that the nondelegation doctrine is too blunt a tool, and
that its resurrection is neither required by the Constitution nor normatively
desirable.24
The argument I advance here is at a different level of reflection. I
contend that this turn against congressional delegations signifies a profound
transformation in our political and intellectual life. It brings to a close
whatever was left of the broadly experimentalist approach to institutional
design that was presaged in Fuller’s lectures. In the place of an ongoing, selfcritical search for legitimacy, we are likely to find hardened battle lines, with
each side offering a romanticized ideal model of governance. This is not only

20

See id. at 2134–35.
See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017) (charting the rise of “anti-administrativism” on the U.S. Supreme Court).
22
See, e.g., Todd Tucker, How a Sex Offender’s Case Before the Supreme Court Could Bring Down
the Administrative State, POLITICO (June 2, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/
06/02/supreme-court-gundy-rapist-227038 [https://perma.cc/9AMT-LDCV]; Nicholas Bagley, Opinion,
‘Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/6DZX-DLHZ].
23
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion).
24
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 22 (“To run a functional, modern government, Congress has no choice
but to delegate authority and discretion to federal agencies. Doing so allows Congress to make use of
agencies’ resources and scientific expertise, to enable a nimble response to emerging problems and to
insulate technocratic decisions from raw politics.”); Scott Lemieux, Wait a Minute, Could John Roberts
Block All of This?, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 27, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/chief-justiceroberts-block-executive-authority [https://perma.cc/45YF-FBDR] (warning that the revival of the
nondelegation doctrine could frustrate initiatives by a progressive governing coalition); Julian Davis
Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding (Dec. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3512154 [https://perma.cc/H8DP-W6B9] (arguing that the nondelegation
doctrine, as understood by contemporary conservative judges and scholars, was not part of the original
constitutional understanding).
21
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a reflection of our oft-bemoaned political polarization. It also represents the
loss of a distinctive style of legal and political inquiry, which continually
sought to reconsider and reconcile the demands of democratic
constitutionalism with the exigencies of contemporary life.
This is not, in other words, an additional argument for keeping the
nondelegation doctrine in mothballs. The observations presented here are
unlikely to move the needle for anyone who is ideologically opposed to the
modern expansion of the administrative state or who believes that “most of
the modern national government is wildly, absurdly, it-is-not-even-a-closecall-obviously unconstitutional.”25 The purpose of this reflection is, instead,
to mark a transformative shift in our constitutional and administrative
politics. What is at stake in this shift, I argue, is the important role of U.S.
administrative agencies in testing what democracy can and should look like
in an increasingly complex, technocratic, and globalized world. And, unlike
the fight over the nondelegation doctrine itself, which still must play out in
the courts, this shift may have already taken place.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I argues that the decade
following Fuller’s lecture did indeed lead to a spirit of constructive, crucial,
and principled engagement with the administrative state, which left a heavy
mark on administrative law scholarship and practice both in the United States
and abroad. Part II then turns to the dissenting opinion in Gundy, which
heralds a return of the nondelegation doctrine, and shows how the approach
announced in this opinion signals a radical shift in the political discourse.
Part III concludes by considering the implications of this shift for our ability
to critically engage and experiment with alternatives in institutional design.
I.

THE “SPIRIT OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS”
IN U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The complex of agencies, bureaucrats, regulations, and practices that
make up the administrative state is in some ways the most salient feature of
modern government.26 Whether one is running a business, receiving public
assistance, muddling through airport security, or, like Herman Gundy,
negotiating the immense and often lifelong consequences of being convicted
of a crime,27 administrative law is a part of one’s life, even more so than the

25
Gary Lawson, Right About the Constitution, BALKINIZATION (June 5, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/06/right-about-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/Y9X4-9JZB].
26
“Modern government,” as one leading casebook puts it, “is administrative government.” STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1
(6th ed. 2006).
27
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133.
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police or the courts.28 And the administrative state today, established on the
basis of broad delegations of statutory authority, presents itself as a nearinevitability, as the federal government is called upon to regulate a wide
range of activities.29
When Fuller delivered his Storrs Lectures in 1963, the U.S.
administrative state was about to enter its most dramatic period of expansion
since the New Deal.30 The administrative state’s ability to harness the power
of law and political organization in pursuit of substantive ends was both
enticing and anxiety-provoking, particularly for those who had grown up in
the aftermath of a world war against fascism and in the shadow of the Soviet
Union.31 Specific critiques leveled against the administrative state in earnest
during this period included charges of pervasive regulatory capture, demands
that agencies respect entitlements arising from social programs, and a
renewed push among business interests toward deregulation.32 More
generally, critics began to express the concern that the concentration of
regulatory authority in the hands of a national executive had brought about
“Madison’s Nightmare”: extensive centralized power organized through an
unintelligible cacophony of warring factional bureaucracies.33
Writing at the high-water mark of this expansion, Richard Stewart
identified a transformation not only in the structure of the administrative
state, but in its legitimating principles.34 Stewart observed that the “ultimate
problem” of administrative law “is to control and validate the exercise of
essentially legislative powers by . . . agencies that do not enjoy the formal
legitimation of one-person one-vote election.”35 For a long time, the
legitimacy of the administrative state was presumed to derive from
congressional delegation: Congress defined the terms of the agency’s power,
28
See Daniel Carpenter, The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 41, 41 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark
A. Peterson eds. 2005). For an example of routine contact with the administrative state, see William H.
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983), which
analyzes encounters of welfare recipients with an increasingly bureaucratized and legalized public
assistance system.
29
See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 107 (2010).
30
See generally BREYER ET AL., supra note 26, at 22.
31
See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973)
(addressing the legitimation problems that arise with state management of the economy); DILEMMAS OF
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1985) (tracing the impact of the postwar welfare
state on law and legal institutions).
32
BREYER ET AL., supra note 26, at 23–24.
33
Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990) (citing THEODORE
J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 200–06 (2d ed. 1978)).
34
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1670–71 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation].
35
Id. at 1688.
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and Congress could take it back.36 Traditional administrative law, in other
words, “conceives of the agency as a mere transmission belt for
implementing legislative directives.”37 Stewart demonstrated the failure of
this transmission belt model, both in practice and in the public and theoretical
imagination, as the problems of the New Deal and afterward demanded everbroader delegations from Congress.38 These problems became even more
acute in the 1960s and 1970s as the administrative state’s role in allocating
private benefits and burdens, and the reality of capture by regulated interests,
became increasingly salient.39
The breakdown of the transmission belt was also what had troubled
Fuller about the administrative state, though with a different emphasis. The
transmission belt offered an account of the administrative state’s legitimacy,
which depended on stable, generally applicable guidance from a
democratically elected Congress.40 Fuller was not directly focused on
democracy or legitimacy, but he was equally concerned with the role of law
in setting down clear, generally applicable and prospective rules that
constrain official discretion.41 But already in 1963, Fuller recognized that this
conception did not describe much of what was happening in the
administrative state.42 He argued that much of the administrative state’s
intervention into the economy dealt with “polycentric problems”: complex
matters of distribution that cannot be resolved through rule-governed
adjudication.43 Fuller recognized that law’s emphasis on generality,
consistency, and stability was not appropriate to many of the tasks assigned
to the administrative state, and that these tasks called instead for something
like private ordering or for a kind of administrative managerialism.44 As the
state becomes increasingly concerned with managing the economy,
questions of institutional design would become paramount, and Fuller
argued strongly against “unthinkingly” carrying over traditional models into

36

Id. at 1675 & nn.20–22.
Id.
38
E.g., id. at 1676–81.
39
Id. at 1681–88.
40
Id. at 1675–76.
41
FULLER, supra note 1, at 39.
42
Id. at 46 (“In recent history perhaps the most notable failure to achieve general rules has been that
of certain of our regulatory agencies, particularly those charged with allocative functions.”).
43
See id. at 29 (first citing MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND
REJOINDERS (1951); then citing MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POSTCRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1958)); Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 1, 3–5 (1960) [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication]; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978).
44
FULLER, supra note 1, at 173; Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 43, at 5.
37
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this new era.45 What was needed, Fuller concluded, was a renewed
engagement with these problems of institutional design—an engagement
that required “[s]omething like the spirit of the Federalist Papers.”46
This does not mean that the administrative state is fundamentally
inconsistent with Fuller’s rule of law values. Administrative agencies can—
and often do—use the discretion granted by Congress to craft detailed
systems of rules, which adopt to some extent all of Fuller’s criteria.47 In
principle, courts could also require agencies to constrain broad statutory
discretion through rulemaking, thereby reintroducing Fuller’s internal
morality into the administrative state.48 But, insofar as this rulemaking took
place without congressional guidance, there would need to be an alternative
account of its legitimacy, which would in turn affect the form and process
for agency self-control. The need for a legitimating rationale applies a
fortiori to the “new modes of governance” that today characterize much of
the administrative state, which do not take the form of rules but of “priority
setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and
strategic enforcement.”49
Following Fuller’s call for renewed engagement, new models of
administrative design and legitimation in fact began to emerge. Stewart, in
particular, argued that courts responded to the failure of the transmission belt
by developing an alternative “interest representation” model of
administration.50 Pursuant to this model, courts reconceived administrative
policymaking as providing “a surrogate political process to ensure the fair
representation of a wide range of affected interests.”51 Interest representation
was by no means a panacea to the administrative state’s legitimacy
problems—Stewart actually thought it was deeply problematic—but it
nonetheless could herald a “new conception of administrative law and . . .
political theory . . . forming among the ruins of the old.”52

45

FULLER, supra note 1, at 176.
Id. at 181.
47
See generally Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 859 (2009).
48
See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725–30 (1969).
Some of these proposals were eventually foreclosed by the Supreme Court. See Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra note 1, at 1936–44.
49
Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 95, 97 (2003).
50
Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1723; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast,
The “Reformation of American Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 782 (2015)
(resituating this court-centric narrative within broader political developments).
51
Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1670.
52
Id. at 1811.
46
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This approach took hold in the literature. Over the following decades,
scholars looked closely at emerging administrative practices and court
decisions to find hints of alternative models of administrative legitimacy;
they built their own models, interrogated them, and attempted to imagine
alternative ways of reconstructing the administrative state, or the state
itself.53 These were not simply rarefied academic theorizing: the models
developed in this body of work were frequently built on the close
examination of particular regulatory schemes,54 and their authors moved
back and forth between policymaking roles and academia.55 By the end of
the twentieth century, the administrative state—both in theory and in
practice—was littered with competing models for its legitimation.56
During this period, much scholarship on the administrative state took
on Fuller’s “spirit of the Federalist Papers.” By way of background, the
Federalist Papers examine in close detail the (then-proposed) constitutional
structure of U.S. government, identifying the implications of even the small
details of that structure for what would now be called political science and

53
See, e.g., PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978) (offering a model of “responsive law” premised on open texture, flexibility, and
change); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (arguing for a focus on non-arbitrariness as the central
principle of administrative legitimacy); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (arguing that the federal
government’s use of dealmaking suggests an alternative regulatory paradigm that should inform
discussions on regulatory reform); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying an alternative form of governance based
on direct participation, information pooling, goal-setting, and mutual learning); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (sketching a model of
“collaborative governance” based on public-private responsibility sharing); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (arguing that direct presidential control over regulation
has displaced earlier models and is normatively and legally defensible); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV.
342 (2004) (charting the rise of “new governance” based on flexibility, public-private collaboration, and
decentralization, among other characteristics); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011) (contrasting the democratic
experimentalist model of regulation with “minimalist” approaches); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that a theory of civic
republicanism, based on participation and deliberation, best justifies the bureaucratic state); Sidney
Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (arguing for an alternative model of administrative legitimacy
based on expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving).
54
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 53, at 55–66 (focusing on specific environmental permit
negotiations).
55
Justice Elena Kagan, who is cited supra note 53 and is the author of the plurality opinion in Gundy,
is only the most salient example.
56
See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
439–46, 448–53 (2003) (discussing five models or approaches of U.S. administrative law).
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political theory.57 To be sure, this was anything but a dispassionate analysis,
having been prepared as an intervention into the political battle in New York
over the future of the Republic.58 But despite, or perhaps because of, the
Federalist Papers’ rough-and-tumble origins, its authors were engaged in a
deep reflection on the design of political institutions, and the values served
by the separations and connections between various government
departments.59
The thinking about the administrative state in recent decades took on a
similarly detail-oriented, institutionally minded approach to legitimacy. In
Stewart’s foundational account, for example, the new model of interest
representation could be found in liberalized standing requirements, broader
participation rights, and the demand to give “due regard” for the views of
stakeholders.60 We could use this model to then identify potential challenges
(such as the problem of identifying stakeholders or gauging the impact of
representation on decision-making),61 and, with the help of political theory,
imagine how extending the model might resolve or exacerbate these
challenges.62 Subsequent projects found new material for this kind of midlevel theorizing in negotiated rulemaking procedures,63 agency-made
standard-setting processes,64 or in federal and local standards and processes
for governing primary education,65 among other subjects.
But this approach also deviated from the Federalist Papers in two
important respects. First, the Federalist Papers’ authors were presenting
what was essentially a done deal to the U.S. public.66 The administrative
state, by contrast, was and remains a work in progress. Scholars and
practitioners of administrative law were, to use an expression that became
familiar during my short time in government, “building the airplane while

57

One could point to any essay to support this point, but a particularly vivid example is Madison’s
sendup of the “political maxim” that each department must be fully separate. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
47 (James Madison).
58
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 84–86 (2010).
59
WALDRON, supra note 11, at 279.
60
Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1723–60.
61
Id. at 1760–90.
62
Id. at 1790–1802.
63
Freeman, supra note 53, at 33–40.
64
Shapiro et al., supra note 53, at 491–501.
65
See generally James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183,
184 (2003).
66
See MAIER, supra note 58, at 69, 86.
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flying it.”67 On this view, the administrative state is less something that needs
to be legitimated and “sold” to a skeptical public, and more something that
can be tinkered with, retheorized, and rethought in light of new internal
developments or external challenges.
Second, because of this state of constant flux, much of the work on the
administrative state took a decidedly critical approach to the problem of its
legitimation. This is in opposition to much of Western political and legal
theory which, for either transparently political reasons or for the sake of
academic inquiry, have sought to explain why the existing social order is
legitimate, or how it might be rendered so.68 Stewart again provides the
paradigmatic example of the critical approach: he expressly describes his
work as being “descriptive and critical” rather than normative, and he is
neither nostalgic for the broken transmission belt model of the administrative
state nor particularly optimistic about the prospects of his “interest group
representation” model.69 The point of his investigation is not to identify the
“right” recipe for legitimating the administrative state, but rather to
recognize how the ongoing need for legitimation is reshaping the state, how
small changes in doctrine or practice can signal alternative visions of our
social order, and how these alternatives might respond to existing problems
even as they generate new ones.
The result was a brand of intellectual engagement that treated the
administrative state as a permanent problem, rather than as a sanctified part
of the political order. We are stuck with the administrative state, it says, but
we must neither embrace it nor reject it in favor of a romanticized past. The
result is a constant churn, as new and emerging ideas take root in various
corners of the state and compete to remake our institutions from the inside
out—whether they be interest group pluralism, civic republicanism,
presidential administration democratic experimentalism, new governance, or
analytic management. To be sure, some theorists were more sanguine about
their preferred governance model.70 But this very methodology, which was
based on excavating and modeling the legitimating ideas already embedded
in institutional practices, carried with it the germ of critical legal studies,
with its emphasis on mapping existing arrangements and reconstructing
67

This approach may echo the street-level approach to regulatory programs by the regulators
themselves. See Josh Pacewicz, The Regulatory Road to Reform: Bureaucratic Activism, Agency
Advocacy, and Medicaid Expansion within the Delegated Welfare State, 46 POL. & SOC. 571, 574 (2018).
68
For two succinct phrasings of the problem, both of which are emblematic of much normative
jurisprudence and political theory, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49 (Betty
Radice & Robert Baldick eds., Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762), and JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993).
69
Stewart, Reformation, supra note 34, at 1670.
70
See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 53, at 283–89; Seidenfeld, supra note 53, at 1515.
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imagined alternatives.71 The “models” that were produced in this fashion thus
tended to be at least implicitly provisional, contestable, and subject to
revision.72
The method proved portable beyond the boundaries of the United
States. When studying the problems of governance beyond the state, it is
useful to have tools enabling a searching and self-critical inquiry into the
legitimation of power absent a direct tether to any electorate. We can
therefore see hallmarks of the U.S. administrative-law method in studies of
Europe’s increasingly complex governance structure,73 and in studies of
global regulatory bodies such as international organizations, transnational
networks, and private standard-setting bodies.74 These efforts included the
Global Administrative Law (GAL) project, which explicitly characterized a
range of public and private global bodies as “administrative” in nature, and
sought to apply to them the same diagnostic and normative tools familiar to
national administrative lawyers.75 Critics sometimes dismissed much of this
71
See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15–27 (1986);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 130–38 (1996) [hereinafter
UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS].
72
See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 175–79 (2002). On
that approach in general, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 538–48 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989).
73
For varying perspectives, see Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative
Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 642
(1999) (“Many influential European commentators, as a means of addressing the democratic deficit in
Europe, increasingly draw inspiration from what they perceive to be the American model of participatory,
non-hierarchical administration.”); Giandomenico Majone, European Regulatory Agencies: The
Dilemma of Delegation of Powers in the European Union, in RISK REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: BETWEEN ENLARGEMENT AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 55, 56–57 (Giandomenico Majone ed.,
2003) (applying Stewart’s insights to EU regulatory agencies); Francesca Bignami, From Expert
Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 868–70 (2011) (tracing the history of challenges to administrative legitimacy in
U.S. and European scholarship); Ming-Sung Kuo, From Administrative Law to Administrative
Legitimation? Transnational Administrative Law and the Process of European Integration, 61 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 855, 855 (2012) (drawing on U.S. and comparative administrative law to illuminate
developments in the EU).
74
See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014) (arguing that
decision-making in global governance bodies should be subject to the same types of constraints that apply
in domestic administrative law); Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 763 (2005) (theorizing global administrative networks in a manner similar to Sabel’s
earlier work on democratic experimentalism in the U.S.); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (arguing that the tools
of administrative law should be applied to regulate international policymaking).
75
See generally Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3328120 [https://perma.cc/4454-F5FL] (surveying the history of global
administrative law methodology); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
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literature as a naïve and somewhat neoliberal normative project.76 But, in the
critical spirit of this line of administrative-law scholarship, a great deal of
work in the GAL vein was dedicated to capturing the normative and practical
dynamics of institutional churn, reconstructing alternative possible futures
embedded in existing arrangements, and subjecting them to critique.77

Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) (identifying an emerging
“global administrative space” that is becoming subject to administrative-law-like requirements such as
reason-giving, transparency, and review); Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1
(2006) (situating these emerging global administrative phenomena in relation to public international law);
Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability,
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM J. INT’L L. 211 (2014) (conceptualizing accountability in
global administration).
76
See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 64 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). There were also some concerns about GAL’s failure to engage with
democracy, which were only later addressed by its founders. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global
Administrative Law and Deliberative Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 526, 526 (Anne Orford, Florian Hoffman & Martin Clark eds., 2016); Peter L.
Lindseth, Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration, 15 GER. L.J.
529, 555 (2014); Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 995,
999–1001 (2005); Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes:
Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 314 (2005).
77
See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What
Role for the Law of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2018) (arguing that new technologies
now pose a fundamental challenge to administrative-law principles that constrain governance
institutions); B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law,
37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2005) (exploring the limited ability of global administrative law to
constrain imperial power); J. Benton Heath, Managing the “Republic of NGOs”: Accountability and
Legitimation Problems Facing the UN Cluster System, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 239 (2014)
(critiquing the emerging “horizontal accountability” structure in the U.N. humanitarian system); Paul
Mertenskötter & Richard B. Stewart, Remote Control: Treaty Requirements for Regulatory Procedures,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 165 (2018) (arguing that newer trade treaties are being used to reshape the domestic
administrative state to favor powerful transnational actors); Bronwen Morgan, Turning Off the Tap:
Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 215 (2006) (exploring the dual roles of political protest and technical expertise in constructing
global administrative spaces); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006) (using the label “global
administrative law” to expose certain aspects of the investment treaty arbitration system). Of course, U.S.
administrative law was not the only tradition that had something to say about global institutions. For
examples drawing on a continental tradition, see THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von
Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010). For instances from outside the Global North, see, for example, Mariana Mota
Prado, Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship Between the
Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 225, 225
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010); Chimni, supra, at 806–11. But, owing to the
privileged position of U.S. experts and scholars and the influence of the United States on the postwar
international order, it was particularly influential. On the Western tilt in GAL, see Carol Harlow, Global
Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 187 (2006) (warning
that administrative law is “primarily a Western construct, protective of Western interests”).
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All of this intellectual development and expansion was made possible
by the breakdown of Stewart’s transmission belt. If it were possible to
control and legitimate the kind of administrative state that we want through
clear delegations laid down in advance by Congress and reviewed by courts,
then there would be no need to launch a decades-spanning intellectual project
to continually reimagine the state’s legitimating principles. There would
have been no special need to think deeply about which doctrinal and practical
developments suggest alternative futures for the design of the administrative
apparatus and its relationship to the governed.78 And there would have been
few lessons for global and private administrative bodies, or for any discipline
that studies the legitimation problems facing governance under conditions of
complexity, electoral breakdown, or globalization.
This is not to say that the intellectual study of the administrative state
has been some unqualified good. Certainly, no one has “solved” the
legitimation problems of the modern administrative state, and even
seemingly good ideas can be pathological in practice or fall prey to “the
tendency of any large bureaucracy to water down transformational concepts
until they cease to have much real meaning.”79 Critics from the left have long
argued that much of this mainstream scholarship only serves to entrench
bureaucracy as the dominant form of social organization.80 If theorists are
too preoccupied by the legitimacy of the administrative state, this argument
goes, then they may too readily accept the false necessity of bureaucracy and
too easily presume the legitimacy of the rest of the constitutional structure.
Other critiques of administrative legitimacy embrace the modern
necessity for the bureaucratic administrative state but come close to
suggesting that we jettison any special desire for its democratic legitimation.
Consider, for instance, Adrian Vermeule’s invocation of Carl Schmitt as a
basis for theorizing the administrative state,81 or Edward Rubin’s deliberately
provocative suggestion that we bracket any notion of democracy or
legitimacy in favor of sterile concepts drawn from management science and
engineering.82 More recently, Nicholas Bagley forcefully argued that this
78
No special need, that is, beyond the general problem that in political life nearly every exercise of
government power suffers from some legitimacy deficit. See infra Part III.
79
ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING 150
(2016).
80
See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276
(1984). For a brief response that probably would not have mollified Frug, see PHILIP SELZNICK, THE
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 258–60 (1992).
81
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009); see also
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613 (2009).
82
EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN
STATE (2005).
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preoccupation with legitimacy has caused progressives to effectively cede
control over the administrative state to a deregulatory Republican agenda.83
While Bagley does not reject the need for legitimacy in the administrative
state, he contends that talk of any “democratic deficit” of agencies vis-à-vis
the other branches of government is overblown, such that the continuing
quest for legitimacy among administrative lawyers is a “sucker’s game.”84
Taken together, these critiques highlight a tension at the center of the
mainstream intellectual project. Mainstream administrative law and theory,
as I have described it, attempts to take seriously both the necessity of the
modern administrative apparatus and its need for democratic legitimation.
This tension produces two opposite risks. On the one hand, the concession
to practical necessity could devolve into apologia for the bureaucratic
administrative state, squeezing out any vision for alternative forms of social
organization.85 On the other, the endless quest for legitimation risks
hamstringing effective governance by effectively blessing any procedural
control, no matter how onerous.86
This tension, though, is what made the U.S. administrative-law project
of the past forty years so generative of new ideas. Theories of the
administrative state that were able to navigate this tension—that could
maintain a commitment to thinking beyond both the received institutional
structures and received notions of what it means to be “democratic”—offered
genuinely novel contributions to the question of what it means to legitimately
govern under conditions of complexity.87 Such theories were eminently
practical without abandoning imagination. They were committed to both the
administrative apparatus and democracy, without purporting to offer a
romanticized understanding of either. And the U.S. administrative state was,
on this view, a laboratory for experiments in designing democracy under
conditions of extreme complexity, technocracy, and globalization. This was,
perhaps, something like the “spirit of the Federalist Papers” that Fuller
imagined.
II. NONDELEGATION’S REVIVAL: DISPELLING FULLER’S SPIRIT?
The apparent revival of the nondelegation doctrine may signal the end
of this experimentalist spirit, at least for the time being. As noted above, there
is a large contingent of theorists, lawyers, and politicians for whom
everything just said about the “spirit of the Federalist Papers” verges on
83
84
85
86
87

Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 348–50 (2019).
Id. at 377–78.
This is the outcome that worried Frug, supra note 80, at 1384–88.
Bagley, supra note 83, at 378.
See supra note 53 and sources cited therein.
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dangerous nonsense. On this view, roughly stated, the U.S. Constitution itself
is the experiment in democracy, and it places broad but significant limits on
the functions that each branch may perform. For some, these limits render
much of modern administrative government unconstitutional, at least in its
current form.88 The administrative state may be an experiment in
something—it may even be someone’s idea of democracy—but it is not
constitutional democracy.
Much of the doctrinal force of this criticism is geared toward restarting
the transmission belt, and that means reviving the nondelegation doctrine.89
Most everyone agrees that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its
legislative power to any other department or body, but the parameters of this
limitation are deeply disputed.90 In 1935, the Supreme Court took a relatively
expansive view of the limitation in two cases, declaring unconstitutional two
parts of a New Deal-era statute, on the ground that Congress had effectively
abdicated its legislative function.91 This came to be known as the
“nondelegation doctrine.” But, since that year, the Court has never again
applied the doctrine to invalidate a statute, allowing instead for even broad
policymaking delegations to stand so long as they provide the agency with
an “intelligible principle” to guide their decisions.92 This broad standard
effectively acknowledged that the transmission belt was not the way to police
the administrative state and set the stage for broad delegations to regulate “in
the public interest” or to impose standards “requisite to protect the public
health.”93

88
See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231
(1994).
89
See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1978); Gary Lawson, Discretion as
Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235
(2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393,
414–23 (2015). In painting these developments with a broad brush, I am necessarily passing over
significant differences among critics. Theodore Lowi, for example, was a longtime critic of broad
delegations and cannot readily be assimilated to any of the political camps that we now see lining up
around this issue. See generally Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987) [hereinafter Lowi, Serfdom].
90
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1721, 1726 (2002) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424–25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
91
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530–42 (1935) (concerning
poultry industry regulations that had been adopted pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 (NIRA)); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–33 (1935) (concerning petroleum trade
restrictions adopted pursuant to the NIRA).
92
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (plurality
opinion) (noting that this standard has been applied “time and again”); id. at 2138–41 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (offering a revisionist history of the “intelligible principle” doctrine).
93
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
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The case Gundy v. United States, decided in June 2019, offered an
opportunity to take the new Court’s temperature on this expansion. Herman
Gundy challenged a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), which delegates to the Attorney General the
authority to “specify the applicability” of the Act’s registration requirements
to persons who were convicted prior to its enactment.94 Knowingly failing to
register was a crime that carried a maximum sentence of ten years in prison.95
Gundy—a pre-enactment sex offender who was convicted of failing to
register in accordance with the Attorney General’s rules—argued that the
Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it
effectively gave the Attorney General carte blanche to legislate crimes.96
Justice Kagan, announcing the opinion of the Court and writing for a fourmember plurality, categorically rejected the challenge, finding that the Act’s
structure, purpose, and history provided an “intelligible principle” to guide
the exercise of delegated authority, placing the statute well within
constitutional bounds.97
More interesting going forward, however, are the concurring and
dissenting opinions, in which four of the Court’s conservative Justices
signaled a willingness to revive and expand the nondelegation doctrine.
Concurring in the Court’s judgment, Justice Alito stated that he would
“support” an effort to “reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84
years” to the nondelegation doctrine, if in a future case a majority of the
Court would be willing to do so.98 Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, to argue that he “would not wait” for
such an opportunity.99 The nondelegation doctrine, Gorsuch argued, is
essential to securing the Constitution’s promise that “only the people’s
elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”100
The dissenting opinion supports its proposed revival of the
nondelegation doctrine with a vision of classical liberal constitutionalism.101
By insisting that Congress agree on the terms of its delegation to
administrative agencies through ordinary Article I procedures, the
nondelegation doctrine secures “the people’s liberty” against an “excess of

94

34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2012); Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012).
96
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
97
Id. at 2129–30 (finding that the law required the Attorney General to order the registration of preSORNA offenders “as soon as feasible” and finding this delegation to be constitutionally sound).
98
Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
99
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
100
Id.
101
See id. at 2133–35.
95
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law-making” by “mak[ing] lawmaking difficult.”102 The nondelegation
doctrine also fosters deliberation among lawmakers, promotes the rule of law
by ensuring the stability and generality of laws, enhances accountability of
elected officials by forcing them to own their decisions, and generally
protects minorities by leveraging the separation of powers to ensure that
“ambition” is made to “counteract ambition.”103 Congress can, consistent
with these principles, announce a broad regulatory policy and authorize the
administration to “fill up the details,” make the application of a rule
dependent on executive factfinding, or delegate to non-legislative
authorities.104 But, if Congress goes further, then the Court “must call foul
when the constitutional lines are crossed.”105
The dissent also sends some rather clear signals that it agrees with
Justice Kagan’s assertion that “if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional,
then most of Government is unconstitutional . . . .”106 For example, the
dissent suggests that the “feasibility standard” that the plurality found to
supply the statute’s “intelligible principle” would not pass constitutional
muster.107 The dissenting opinion also takes a slight detour to quote Justice
Douglas’s view that “Congress defaulted when it left it up to an agency to
do what the ‘public interest’ indicated should be done.”108 These types of
delegations—requiring agencies to regulate in the public interest or to take
“feasible” measures—are exactly the sort of provisions that appear in
numerous statutes previously upheld by the Court, and which form the basis

102

Id. at 2134 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison)).
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). Notably, Madison’s observation that
ambition must be made to counteract ambition is also an animating motive behind much mainstream
scholarship on the structure and legitimation of the administrative state. See, e.g., SELZNICK, supra note
80, at 334–36 (suggesting that these Madisonian principles have “broader relevance” to public and private
affairs).
104
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
105
Id. at 2135.
106
Id. at 2120 (plurality opinion).
107
Id. at 2145–46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the plurality that the
statute contained a feasibility standard at all, but more interesting is its discussion of the standard’s
constitutionality. See id. at 2145 (“A statute directing an agency to regulate private conduct to the extent
‘feasible’ can have many possible meanings: It might refer to ‘technological’ feasibility, ‘economic’
feasibility, ‘administrative’ feasibility, or even ‘political’ feasibility. Such an ‘evasive standard’ could
threaten the separation of powers if it effectively allowed the agency to make the ‘important policy
choices’ that belong to Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’ And that seems exactly
the case here, where the Attorney General is left free to make all the important policy decisions and it is
difficult to see what standard a court might later use to judge whether he exceeded the bounds of the
authority given to him.”).
108
Id. at 2140 n.63 (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS
217 (1974)). The quote continues: “‘Public interest’ is too vague a standard to be left to free-wheeling
administrators. They should be more closely confined to specific ends or goals.” Id.
103
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of much modern regulatory activity.109 The dissenting opinion also notably
draws on scholarship arguing explicitly that key components of the modern
state—including provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the
Communications Act of 1934, and the Clean Air Act—are “easy cases” for
unconstitutional delegations.110 Given these signals throughout the opinion,
many will not be comforted by the dissent’s insistence that nothing it says
would “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state.’”111
Given the split nature of this decision, it remains unclear whether doom
is on its way. Since Gundy, there has been no shortage of predictions about
how Justice Kavanaugh would rule if the nondelegation issue were raised in
a new case.112 When sitting on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge
Kavanaugh certainly was skeptical of creative congressional delegations and
willing to deploy his own reading of the text and structure of the Constitution
to strike down institutional experiments by Congress.113 And more recently,
Justice Kavanaugh has signaled his agreement with the dissenters’
arguments in Gundy.114 Nevertheless, as Adrian Vermeule recently pointed
out, when it comes to dismantling the nondelegation doctrine, there is a big
difference between talking the talk in dissent and walking the walk in a
controlling opinion, and there is some history of conservative-leaning
Justices doing the former but not the latter.115 There may thus be reason to
109
See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943) (upholding Section 303 of
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012), which enables the Federal Communications
Commission to make regulations on certain subjects “from time to time, as public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires”). The Gundy plurality noted other statutes that use “feasibility” as a principle to
guide regulatory policymaking. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1701z2(a) (2012) and 47 U.S.C. § 903(d)(1) (2012)).
110
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 379–81 (2002)
(cited in Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 n.29 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)). Lawson notably states that he is
“agnostic” on the question of whether the Court itself should apply the nondelegation doctrine. Lawson,
supra, at 335. But the Gundy dissent is not.
111
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145.
112
For an early appraisal of such efforts, see Mark Tushnet, Talking About Judge Kavanaugh as a
Justice, BALKINIZATION (July 10, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/07/talking-about-judgekavanaugh-as-justice.html [https://perma.cc/ZN83-K2AX].
113
See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for
review granted in part and denied in part and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
114
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine
in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
115
Adrian Vermeule, Never Jam Today, NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 2019),
https://yalejreg.com/nc/never-jam-today-by-adrian-vermeule [https://perma.cc/X3D9-8JS9] (“Ever since
I started law school in 1990, almost thirty years ago, I’ve been hearing that the Court’s libertarian-legalist
conservatives would definitely invalidate some statute or other on nondelegation grounds, any day now,
without question . . . . And yet somehow, when push came to shove, when it was a question of actually
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suspect that a modified version of the status quo could continue, with
nondelegation continuing to serve only a background role as a canon of
avoidance and statutory construction.116
Nevertheless, the retrograde transmission belt model of administration
implied in the Gundy dissent does signal a profound shift in the intellectual
project of the U.S. administrative state. The dissent’s particular view of the
nondelegation doctrine draws its normative force from a relatively inactive
administration: Congress either reaches agreement through robust
deliberation on the precise parameters of its delegation or it does not delegate
at all, and either outcome is assumed to vindicate individual liberty.117 In
reaction to this position, defenders of the administrative state are forced to
justify not only particular regulatory programs, but the very act of regulation
itself as an enterprise that can equally be supportive of some constellation of
constitutional values. This reactive position can be seen in recent work that
warns of “anti-administrativist” tendencies on the Court and attempts to offer
a comprehensive constitutional justification for the administrative state.118
This realignment heralds a return to old-style legitimacy politics, and a
turn away from the Fullerian spirit discussed above. When the very existence
of the bureaucracy is at stake, there is little room for cautious optimists to
treat the regulatory state as a permanent problem, or even to be entirely
candid as to their own skepticism about its legitimacy. Instead, the
administrative state is presented and defended as already legitimate. On the
other side, anti-administrativist forces call into question the entire regulatory
enterprise by reference to the imagined legitimacy of a romanticized past.
Neither of these positions takes seriously the legitimacy of institutions as

assembling five votes to declare a federal statute unconstitutional on grounds not invoked for decades,
grounds that would threaten to destabilize much of the modern administrative state — when it came time
to act, as opposed to venting one’s constitutional frustrations in concurrence and dissents — well, it never
did quite happen. Justice Scalia’s Mistretta dissent became his brusque opinion in Whitman v. American
Trucking, sweeping aside a serious nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air Act. Jam yesterday
(yesterday being 1935), and jam tomorrow, but never jam today.”).
116
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000) (arguing
that the doctrine of nondelegation has been “relocated” so that “nondelegation canons” now are relied
upon “to forbid administrative agencies from making decisions on their own”); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 455
(2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court “has shifted the focus from constitutional law to administrative
law as a basis for requiring administrative standards” that guide administrative policymaking).
Continental jurisdictions, where a version of the nondelegation doctrine continues to play a vital role in
constitutional law and politics, may offer visions of alternative equilibria. See Peter L. Lindseth, The
Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and
France, 1920s–1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1354–71 (2004) (describing the German version).
117
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
118
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 21.
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they actually exist—always in doubt, failing to live up to their boldest
promises, and suggestive of alternative futures.
III. LEGITIMACY’S END
In short, the immediate consequence of the rising anti-administrativism
on the Court may be a fundamental shift in the terms of our engagement with
what it means to be legitimately and democratically governed. For four
decades, mainstream administrative law offered a singular laboratory for
problematizing and rethinking what it means to be democratically governed
under contemporary conditions. This was an oddly critical counterpoint to
much normative legal and political theory, which during the same period
remained concerned with defending the legitimacy of some idealized
conception of liberal democracy. But this experimental spirit was only made
possible by the recognized breakdown of the administrative transmission
belt. The Court’s latest effort to jumpstart that transmission belt thus signals
a return to dueling visions of the ideal constitutional structure, which
threatens to crowd out any remaining attempts at experimentation. It
therefore serves to close by reflecting on what may come next.
The same week that Gundy was handed down, intellectuals recognized
the ninetieth birthday of Jürgen Habermas. For much of his life, Habermas
has worked firmly in the Western philosophical tradition, taking as his
central problem the “legitimacy” of power relations.119 Habermas’s
“discourse” theory of democracy—which takes as its regulative ideal the
concept of rational, unforced deliberation—appears at first blush to be wellsuited to address the tensions between technocratic rationality and political
action in the modern administrative state.120 And, indeed, Habermas’s theory
has provoked a great deal of thinking about administration and democracy,
both in the United States and beyond.121
119

E.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION AND
(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1979) (1976).
120
Habermas’s own approach to the administrative state has much in common with Fuller’s spirit,
though he arguably demands a greater level of engagement by parliament. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
440–41 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). For a critique, see RUBIN, supra note 82, at 159–
60.
121
See B. S. Chimni, Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model, 14 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 151, 164–65 (2001); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy,
3 EUR. L.J. 313, 337–42 (1997); Esty, supra note 74, at 1520–21; A. Michael Froomkin,
Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 751–52
(2003); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 737 (1999); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 29–30 (2001); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive
Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1255, 1258 n.130 (1995).
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Longtime critic Raymond Geuss took the opportunity of this day to call
into question the legacy of Habermas and his fellow travelers. For Geuss, the
Western philosophical tradition need not be preoccupied with legitimating
the existing institutions of liberal democracy. He writes:
[I]t is a Kantian prejudice that “legitimation” is the basic problem of philosophy
or even the basic problem of philosophy in the modern era. It is even less
plausible to think that it is the basic social problem of the modern world . . . .
The foolish claim that “we live in the best of all possible worlds” is not the best
defense of the status quo. It is much more effective to hide one’s affirmation of
the given social and economic structures, while trumpeting the opportunities
one’s philosophy provides for criticizing a wide variety of individual flaws,
defects and inadequacies. An ideology of “discursive criticism” also has much
better chances of establishing itself because of certain psychological advantages
it gives to those who adopt it. It is well suited to absorb, deflect and channel
destructive energies that might otherwise get out of hand, by, thanks be to Kant,
imposing discipline on existing discontent and dissipating it in small packets of
reformist criticism of individual imperfections and blemishes of the social
system.122

At the risk of aggrandizing this corner of U.S. law, it may serve to think
of recent developments in the administrative state as being consistent with
this broader pull away from the politics of legitimacy. A clash between socalled administrativist and anti-administrativist forces would in some sense
be the reduction to absurdity of Western thought’s concern with legitimating
state institutions. The diffusion of coercive public power throughout a vast,
impersonal bureaucracy that is largely unintelligible to the average citizen
cannot be said to be unproblematically “legitimate” in any meaningful sense
of that term. At the same time, there is likely no danger of the antiadministrativist position casting the United States back to the nineteenth
century, simply because the practical constraints are just too strong.123 The
most likely outcome of this clash, then, is a case-by-case resolution of
challenges to the administrative state, with each side retroactively claiming
legitimacy from its preferred source.
From the perspective of critical theory, this development could be
viewed as an opportunity. As the Fullerian period of U.S. administrative law

122

Raymond Geuss, A Republic of Discussion: Habermas at Ninety, POINT (June 18, 2019),
https://thepointmag.com/2019/politics/republic-of-discussion-habermas-at-ninety
[https://perma.cc/F2LP-46SG].
123
See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court Is One Vote Away from Changing How the U.S. Is
Governed, NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-supremecourt-is-one-vote-away-from-changing-how-the-us-is-governed [https://perma.cc/4SC4-5TDL].
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comes to a close,124 there is no longer any need for quasi-critical theory to act
as the handmaiden of existing institutions and power relations. Critical work
on the administrative state will no longer have to reduce itself to what Geuss
evocatively calls “small packets of reformist criticism” in order to be heard,
because no one will be listening. There will be no need to compromise the
impulse to radical critique by, for example, accepting the false necessity of
bureaucracy, or by treating the elected legislature as a yardstick for
legitimacy. Meanwhile, the clash between opposing forces over the existing
administrative state will continue to litter corners of U.S. administrative law
with the vestiges of past and discarded solutions, ripe for recombination in
new constructive-critical projects.125
But that critical project would not be a mainstream one. The turn away
from the Fullerian spirit in administrative law would spell the end of one
interesting corner of U.S. legal theory and practice, where it was acceptable
to openly question what it means to be democratically governed under
conditions of deepening complexity. The critical method and the drive for
legitimation were perhaps always uneasy partners in this endeavor, and their
coexistence surely kept out some of the more unruly responses to the
dominant political order. But, in exchange, this partnership created a space
where experiments in legitimacy could be carried out with the backing of the
state and interrogated openly and critically. If that searching intellectual
project is lost—and the constellation of decisions in Gundy suggests that it
is—then that is something to be mourned.

124

Here, I’ve used Fullerian in the sense just described—a spirit of open and constructive inquiry
into the problems of institutional design—and not in the sense used recently by Sunstein and Vermeule
to describe doctrines that enforce Fuller’s principles of legality in administrative law. Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1965–67. As noted supra, in my view these authors have understated the extent
to which Fuller understood and appreciated the problems posed by the administrative state, and they do
not directly engage with Fuller’s comments on institutional design.
125
Cf. UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 71, at 65–67 (“Law produced through . . . irremediable
conflict will be messy, and all the more messy in a democracy valuing and institutionalizing pluralism.”).
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